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1.  Overview 
Linguistic  theories  typically  assign  various  linguistic 
phenomena  to one of the  categories, syntactic,  semantic, 
or pragmatic,  as if the  phenomena  in  each  category were 
relatively independent  of  those  in  the  others.  However, 
various  phenomena  in  discourse  do  not  seem  to  yield 
comfortably to any  account  that  is strictly  a  syntactic or 
semantic  or  pragmatic  one.  This  paper  focuses  on 
particular  phenomena  of  this  sort-the  use  of  various 
referring  expressions  such  as  definite  noun  phrases  and 
pronouns-and  examines  their  interaction  with 
mechanisms used to maintain discourse coherence. 
Even  a  casual  survey  of  the  literature  on  definite 
descriptions  and  referring  expressions  reveals  not  only 
defects  in  the  individual  accounts  provided  by  theorists 
(from  several  different  disciplines),  but  also  deep 
confusions  about  the  roles  that  syntactic,  semantic,  and 
pragmatic  factors  play  in  accounting  for  these 
phenomena.  The  research  we  have  undertaken  is  an 
attempt to sort out some of these confusions and  to create 
the basis for a  theoretical framework that can account for 
a  variety  of  discourse  phenomena  in  which  all  three 
factors  of  language  use  interact.  The  major  premise  on 
which our research depends is that the concepts  necessary 
for  an  adequate  understanding  of  the  phenomena  in 
question  are  not  exclusively  either  syntactic  or  semantic 
or pragmatic. 
The  next  section  of  this  paper  defines  two  levels  of 
discourse coherence and describes their roles in accounting 
for the use of singular definite noun phrases.  To illustrate 
the  integration  of  factors  in  explaining  the  uses  of 
referring expressions, their  use on  one of these  levels, i.e., 
the  local  one,  is  discussed  in  Sections  3  and  4.  This 
account requires introducing the notion of the centers of a 
sentence  in  a  discourse, a  notion that cannot be defined in 
terms of factors that  are exclusively syntactic or semantic 
or  pragmatic.  In  Section  5,  the  interactions  of  the  two 
levels with  these  factors  and  their  effects  on  the  uses  of 
referring expressions in discourse are discussed. 
2.  The  Effects  of Different  Levels  of Discourse 
Coherence 
A  discourse  comprises  utterances  that  combine  into 
subconstituents  of  the  discourse,  namely,  units  of 
discourse  that  are typically larger  than  a  single sentence, 
but  smaller  than  the  complete  discourse.  However,  the 
constituent  structure  is  not  determined  solely  by  the 
linear  sequence  of  utterances.  It  is  common  for  two 
contiguous  utterances  to  be  members  of  different 
subconstituents  of  the  discourse  (as  with  breaks  between 
phrases in  the syntactic analysis of a sentence); likewise, it 
is common  for  two  utterances  that  are  not  contiguous  to 
be members of the same subconstituent. 
An individual subcoastituent of a  discourse exhibits both 
internal  coherence  and  coherence  with  the  other 
subconstituents.  That  is,  discourses  have  been  shown  to 
have  two  levels of coherence.  Global coherence refers  to 
the  ways  in  which  the  larger segments of discourse relate 
to one another.  It depends on such  things as the function 
of  a  discourse,  its  subject  matter,  and  rhetorical schema 
[Grosz,  1977,  1981;  Reichman,  1981 I.  Local coherence 
refers  to  the  ways  in  which  individual  sentences  bind 
together  to  form larger  discourse segments.  It depends on 
such  things  as  the  syntactic  structure  of  an  utterance, 
ellipsis,  and  the  use  of  pronominal  referring  expressions 
[Sidner,  1981 I. 
The  two  levels of discourse coherence correspond to two 
levels  of  focusing--global  focusing  and  centering. 
Participants  are  said  to  be  globally  focused  on  a  set  of 
entitie.~  relevant  to  the  overall  discourse.  These  entities 
may  either  have  been  explicitly  introduced  into  the 
discourse or be sufficiently closely related to such  entities 
to  be  considered  implicitly  in  focus  [Grosz,  19811  .  In 
contrast,  centering refers to a  more local focusing process, 
one  relates  to  identifying  the  single  entity  that  an 
individual  utterance  most  centrally  concerns  [Sidner, 
1979;  Joshi and  Weinstein,  1981]. 
IThis  research  was  supported  in  part  by  the  National  Science 
Foundation  under Grant  MCS-8115105 to  SRI  International,  and 
Grant MCS81-07290 to the University of Pennsylvania. 
44 The  two  levels  of  focusing/coherence  have  different 
effects  on  the  processing  of  pronominal  and 
nonpronominal  definite noun  phrases.  Global  coherence 
and  focusing  are  major  factors  in  the  generation  and 
interpretation  of  nonpronominal  def'lnite  referring 
expressions.  2 Local coherence  and centering have  greater 
effect on  the  processing  of  pronominal  expressions.  In 
Section 5 we shall describe  the rules governing  the use of 
these  kinds  of  expressions  and  shall  explain  why 
additional  processing  by  the hearer  (needed  for drawing 
additional  inferences}  is  involved  when  pronominal 
expressions  are used to refer to globally focused entities  or 
nonpronominal  expressions  are used  to refer to centered 
entities. 
Many  approaches  to  language  interpretation  have 
ignored  these  differences,  depending  instead  on  powerful 
inference  mechanisms to identify the referents of referring 
expressions.  Although  such  approaches  may  suffice, 
especially  for  well-formed  texts,  they  are  insufficient  in 
general.  In particular,  such  approaches  will not work for 
generation.  Here  the  relationships  among  focusing, 
coherence,  and  referring  expressions  are  essential  and 
must  be  explicitly  provided  for.  Theories-and  systems 
based  on  them--will  generate  unacceptable  uses  of 
referring  expressions  if  they  do  not  take  these 
relationships  into account. 3 
3.  Centering  and  Anaphora 
In our  theory,  the centers  of a sentence  in a discourse 
serve  to integrate  that sentence into the discourse.  Each 
sentence,  S, has a single backward-looking center,  Cb(S), 
and  a set of forward-looking centers, Cf(S).  Cb(S) serves 
to  link  S  to  the  preceding discourse,  while  Cf(S)  provides 
a set of entities  to which the succeeding discourse may be 
linked.  To  avoid  confusion,  the  phrase  =the  center"  will 
be used  to refer only to Cb(S). 
To  clarify  the  notion  of  center,  we  will  consider  a 
number  of discourses  illustrating  the  various  factors  that 
are  combined  in  its  definition  (abstractly)  and  in  its 
identification  in  a discourse.  In Section 5 we define center 
more  precisely,  show  how  it  relates  to  Sidner's  [1981] 
immediate  focus  and  potential  loci,  and  discuss  how  the 
linkages  established  by  the  centers  of a  sentence  help  to 
determine  the  degree of intelligibility  of a  discourse.  We 
begin  by  showing  that  the  center  cannot  be  defined  in 
syntactic  terms  alone.  The  interaction  of semantics  and 
centering is more complex and  is discussed in Section 4. 
The  following  examples,  drawn  from  Reinhart  [1982], 
illustrate  the  point  that  the  notion  of  center  is  not 
syntactically  definable, 4  i.e.,  the  syntax  of  a  sentence  S 
does  not determine  which  of its  NPs realizes Cb(S).  (The 
2They differ in  other  respects also. Reichman [19811 a~d  Grosz 
[19811  discuss  some  of these. 
3Initial  attempts to incorporate focusing  mechanisms in generation 
systems are described  in [Appelt,  1981 and MeKeown, 1982]. 
41ntonation can  obviously affect the  interpretation; for  the 
purposes of this  paper,  it may be regarded  a~ part  of a syntax. 
reasons  for the  use of this terminology  axe discussed  in 
Section 4.) 
(t&)  Who  did  Max  see  yesterday? 
(lb)  Max  saw  Rosa. 
(2a)  Did  anyone  see  Ros&  yesterday? 
(2b)  Max  s~w Rosa. 
Although (lb)  and  (2b)  are  identical,  Cb(lb)  is Max  and 
Cb(2b)  is  Rosa.  This can  be seen  in  part by noticing that 
=He saw  Rosa"  seems  more  natural  than  (lb)  and  =Max 
saw  her"  than  (2b)  (a  fact  consistent  with  the  centering 
rule  introduced  in  Section  5.)  The  subject  NP  is  the 
center in one context, the object NP in the other. 
Even  when  the  NP  used  to  realize  Cb(S)  can  be 
syntactically  determined,  the  Cb(S)  itself  is  not  yet  fully 
determined,  for  Cb(S)  is  typically  not  a  linguistic  entity 
(i.e.,  it  is  not a  particular  linguistic  expression).  Rosa,  not 
°Rosa °  is the Cb(2b).  Consider. the discourse: 
(3z)  How  is  Rosa? 
(3b)  Did  anyone  see  her  yesterday? 
(3e)  Max  saw  her. 
Here,  Cb(3c)  is  Rosa,  but  clearly  would  not  be  in  other 
contexts  where  the  expression  "her"  still  realized  the 
backward-looking  center  of  "Max  saw  her."  This  is  seen 
most  simply  by  considering  the  discourse  that  would 
result  if  "How  is  Joan?"  replaced  (3a).  In  the  discourse 
that resulted,  Joan, not Rosa, would be the center of (3c). 
4.  Centering  and  Realization 
The interactions of semantic  and  pragmatic  factors with 
centering  and  their  effects  on  referring  expressions  are 
more complex  than  the  preceding discussion  suggests.  In 
the examples given  above,  the NPs that  realize Cb(S) also 
denote  it., but  this  is  not  always  the  case:  we  used  the 
term  "realize"  in  the  above  discussion  advisedly.  In  this 
section,  we  consider  two  kinds  of examples  in  which  the 
center  of a  sentence  is  not simply  the  denotation  of some 
noun  phrase  occurring  in  the  sentence.  First,  we  will 
examine  several  examples  in  which  the  choice  of  and 
interaction  among  different  kinds  of  interpretations  of 
definite  noun  phrases  are  affected  by  the  local  discourse 
context  (i.e.,  centering}.  Second,  the  role  of  pragmatic 
factors  in  some  problematic  cases  of  referential  uses  of 
definite descriptions [Donnellan  1966] is discussed. 
4.1.  Realization  and  Value-Free  and  Value-Loaded 
Interpretations 
The  distinction  between  realization  and  semantic 
denotation  is  necessary  to  treat  the  interaction  between 
value-free  and  value-loaded  interpretations  [Barwise  and 
Perry,  1982] of  definite  descriptions,  as  they  occur  in 
extended  discourse.  Consider,  for example,  the  following 
sequence: 
45 (4a)  The  vice  president  of  the  United  States 
is  also  president  of  the  Senate. 
(4b)  Historically,  he  is  the  president's  key 
man  in  negotiations  with  Congress. 
(4b')  As  Ambassador  to  China,  he  handled 
many  tricky  negotiations,  so  he  is 
well  prepared  for  this  Job. 
Cb(4b)  and  Cb(4b')  are each  realized by the  anaphoric 
element  "he. =  But  (4b)  expresses  the  same  thing  as 
"Historically,  the  vice  president  of  the  United  States  is 
the  president's  key  man  in  negotiations  with  Congress" 
(in  which  it  is  clear  that  no  single  individual  vice 
president is being referred to) whereas (4b') expresses the 
same thing as,  "As ambassador to China,  the [person who 
is now]  vice president of the United  States handled  many 
tricky  negotiations,..."  This  can  be  accounted  for  by 
observing  that  "the  vice  president of the  United  States" 
contributes  both  its  value-free  interpretation  and  its 
value-loading at the world type to Cf(4a).  Cb(4b) is then 
the  value-free  interpretation  and  Cb(4b')  is  the  value- 
loading, i.e., George Bush. 
In  this  example,  both  value-free  and  value-loaded 
interpretations  are  showu  to  stem  from  the  same  full 
definite noun  phrase.  It is also possible for the movement 
of the  center  from  a  value-free interpretation  (for  Cb(S)) 
to  a  value-loaded  interpretation  (for  Cb  of  the  next 
sentence)-or  vice  versa-to  be  accomplished  solely  with 
pronouns.  That  is,  although  (4b)-(4b')  is  (at  least  for 
some  readers)  not  a  natural  dialogue,  similar  sequences 
are possible. 
There  appear  to  be  strong  constraints  on  the  kinds  of 
transitions  that  are  allowed.  In  particular,  if  a  given 
sentence  forces  either  the  value-free  or  value-loaded 
interpretation,  then  only  that  interpretation  becomes 
possible  in  a  subsequent  sentence.  However,  if  some 
sentence  in  a  given  context  merely  prefers  one 
interpretation  while allowing the other, then either one is 
possible in a subsequent sentence. 
For example, the sequence. 
(Sa)  The  vice  president  of  the  United  States 
is  also  president  of  the  Senate. 
(Sb) He's  the  president's key a~  in  ne~otiatione 
with  Congress. 
in  which  "he"  may  be  interpreted  a~  either  value-free 
(iT')  or  value-loaded  (VL}, may  be  followed  by  either  of 
the following two sentences: 
(5c)  As  ambassador  to China. he 
handled  many  tricky  negotiations.  (VL) 
(5c') He is required to he at  least 35 years old.  (V'F') 
tlowever,  if  we  change  (Sb)  to  force  the  value-loaded 
interpretation, as in (5b'), then only (5c) is possible. 
($b') Right non he  is the  president's 
key man £n negotiations  sith Congress. 
Similarly,  if  {5b)  is  changed  to  force  the  value-free 
interpretation, as in {4b),  then only (5c') is possible. 
If  an  intermediate  sentence  allows  both  interpretations 
but  prefers one  in  a  given  context,  then  either  is possible 
in  the  third  sentence.  A  use with  preference for  a  value- 
loaded  interpretation  followed  by  a  use  indicating  the 
value-free interpretation is illustrated in the sequence: 
John  thinks  that  the  telephone  £s  a  toy. 
He  plays with  it  every  day.  (V~  preferred;  V~ok) 
He doesn't realize  that £t is tn £nventlon 
that changed  the world.  (V~ 
The  preference  for  a  value-free  interpretation  that  is 
followed  bv  a  value-loaded  one  is  easiest  to  see  in  a 
dialogue situation: 
st:  The  vice  president  of  the  United  States 
is  also  president  of  the  Senate. 
s2:  I  thought  he  played  some 
important role  in  the  House.  (VFpreferred;  VL  ok) 
st:  He  did.  but  that  van  before  he  vu  VP.  (V~) 
4.2.  Realization  and  Referential  Use 
From  these examples,  it might appear that the concepts 
of value-free  and value-loaded  interpretation  are identical 
to  Donnellan's  I19661 attributive  and  referential uses  of 
noun  phrases.  However,  there is an important  difference 
between  these  two  distinctions. The  importance  to  our 
theory is that the referential use of definite noun  phrases 
introduces  the  need  to  take  pragmatic  factors  (in 
particular  speaker  intention)  into  account,  not  just 
seman| ic factors. 
DonnelIan  [1966[  describes  the  referential  and 
attributive  uses  of definite descriptions  in  the  following 
way: 
"A  speaker  who  uses  a  definite description 
attributively  in  an  assertion  states something 
about whoever  or whatever  is the so-and-so.  A 
speaker  who  uses  a  definite  description 
referentially in  an  a~sertion, on  the other  hand , 
uses  the  description  to  enable  his  audience  to 
pick  out  whom  or  what  he is talking about and 
states something  about  that  person  or  thing.  In 
the  first  case  the  definite  description  might  be 
said  to occur  essentially, for  the  speaker  wishes 
to  assert  something about  whatever or whoever 
fits  that  description;  but  in  the  referential  use 
the  definite  description  is  merely  one  tool  for 
doing a certain job--calling attention to a  person 
or  thing--and  in  gefieral  any  other  device  for 
doing  the  same  job,  another  description  or  a 
name.  would  do  as  well.  In  the  attributive  use, 
the  attribute  of  being  the  so-and-so  is  all 
imp~,rtant, while it is not in the referential use.* 
The distinction Donnellan suggests can  be formulated in 
terms of the different propositions a sentence S containing 
a  definite  description  D  may  be  used  to  express  on 
differcn! occasions of use.  When D  is used referentially, it 
contributes its denotation  to  the  proposition expressed  by 
~6 S;  when  it  is  used  attributively,  it  contributes  to  the 
proposition  expressed  by  S  a  semantic  interpretation 
related  to the descriptive  content  of D. The  identity of 
this semantic  interpretation  is not something  about which 
Donnellan  is explicit.  Distinct  formal  treatments  of the 
semantics  of  definite  descriptions  in  natural  language 
would  construe  the appropriate interpretation differently. 
In  semantic  treatments  based  on  possible  worlds,  the 
appropriate  interpretation  would  be  a  (partial}  function 
from possible worlds to objects; in  the situation semantics 
expounded  by  Barwise  and  Perry,  the  appropriate 
interpretation  is  a  (partial}  function  from  resource 
situations  5 to objects. 
.As just  described,  the  referential-attributive distinction 
appears  to  be  exactly  the  distinction  that  Barwise  and 
Perry  formulate  in  terms  of  the  value-loaded  and  value- 
free  interpretations  of  definite  noun  phrases.  But  this 
gloss  omits  an  essential  aspect  of  the  referential- 
attributive  distinction  as  elaborated  by  Donnellan.  In 
Donnellan's  view,  a  speaker  may  use  a  description 
referentially  to  refer  to  an  object  distinct  from  the 
semantic denotation  of the description, and,  moreover,  to 
refer  to  an  object  even  when  the  description  has  no 
semantic denotation. 
In  one  sense,  this  phenomenon  arises  within  the 
framework  of  Barwise  and  Perry's  treatment  of 
descriptions.  If we understand  the semantic denotation of 
a  description  to  be  the  unique  object  that  satisfies  the 
content  of  the  description,  if  there  is  one,  then  Barwise 
and  Perry would allow that  there are referential uses of a 
description  D  that  contribute  objects  other  than  the 
semantic denotation of D  to the propositions expressed by 
uses  of  sentences  in  which  D  occurs.  But  this is only 
because Barwise  and Perry  allow that a description  may 
be  evaluated  at  ~  resource  situation  other  than  the 
complete situation in order to arrive at its denotation  on 
a  given  occasion  of  use. Still, the  denotation  of  the 
description  relative to  a  given  resource  situation  is the 
unique object  in the situation that satisfies  the description 
relative to that situation. 
The referential uses of descriptions  that Donnellan  gives 
examples  of  do  not  seem  to  arise by  evaluation  of 
descriptions  at alternative  resource situations, but rather 
through  the "referential intentions"  of the speaker in his 
use of the description. This aspect of referential use is a 
pragmatic  rather than a semantic phenomenon  and is best 
analyzed  in  terms  of  the  distinction  between  semantic 
reference  and  speaker's  reference  elaborated  in  Kripke 
[10vv]. 
Con~idcr  the  following  discourses  drawn  from  Kripke 
{lov~'l: 
(6a)  Her husband is kind to her. 
(6b)  No.  he isn't.  The usa  you're 
referring  to  isn't her  husband. 
(7a)  Her  husband  is  kind  to  her. 
(7b)  He  is  kind  to  her  but  be  isn't  her  husband. 
With  (6a)  and  (7a),  Kripke  has  in  mind  a  case  like the 
one discussed in  Donnellan  [1066],  in which a  speaker uses 
a  description  to  refer  to  something  other  than  the 
semantic referent of that description, i.e., the unique thing 
that  satisfies  the  description  (if  there  is  one).  Kripke 
analyzes  this  case  as  an  instance  of  the  general 
phenomenon  of  a  clash  of intentions  in  language  use.  In 
the  case  at  hand,  the speaker has  a  general  intention  to 
use  the  description  to  refer  to  its  semantic  referent;  his 
specific  intention,  distinct  from  his  general  semantic 
intention,  is  to  use  it  to  refer  to  a  particular  individual. 
He  incorrectly  believes that  these  two  intentions coincide 
and this gives rise to a  use of the referring expression  "her 
husband"  in  which  the  speaker's  reference  and  the 
semantic  reference  are  distinct. "8  (The  speaker's referent 
is presumably the woman's ]over). 
From  our  point  of  view,  the  importance  of  the  case 
resides  in  its showing  that  Cf(S)  may  include  more  than 
one  entity,  that  is  realized  by  a  single  NP  in  S. In  this 
case,  "her  husband"  contributes  both  the  husband  and 
the  lover  to  Cf{6a}  and  Cf(Ta).  This  can  be  seen  by 
observing  that  both  discourses  seem  equally  appropriate 
and  that  the  backward-looking centers  of  (6b)  and  /7b) 
are  the  husband  and  the  lover,  respectively,  realized  by 
their  anaphoric  elements.  Hence,  the  forward-looking 
centers of a  sentence  may be related not semantically but 
pragmatically to the NPs that realize them. 
Hence,  the  importance  of  the  referential/attributive 
distinction from our point of view is that  it leads to cases 
in  which  the  centers  of a  sentence  may  be  pragmatically 
rather  than  semantically related to the  noun  phrases  that 
realize them. 
5.  Center  Movement  and  Center  Realization-- 
Constraints 
In  the  foregoing sections we have discussed a  number  of 
examples to illustrate two essential points. First, the  noun 
phrase  that  realizes  the  backward-looking  center  of  an 
utterance  in  a  discourse  cannot  be  determined  from  the 
syntax  of  the  utterance  alone.  Second,  the  relation  N 
realizes  c  between  noun  phrases  N  and  centers  c  is 
neither  solely a  semantic  nor  solely a  pragmatic  relation. 
This  discussion  has  proceeded  at  a  rather  intuitive  level, 
without  explicit elaboration  of  the  framework  we  regard 
as  appropriate  for  dealing  with  centering  and  its  role  in 
explaining  disco,trse  phenomena.  Before  going  on  to 
describe  constraints  on  the  realization  relation  that 
5Roughly,  *any situation  on  which  the  speaker  can  focus 
attention °  is  a  potential  candidate  for  a  resource  situation  with 
respect  to  which the  speaker  may  value  load  his  uses  of  definite 
descriptions. Such resource situations  must  contain  a  unique object 
which satisfies the description. 
6There  are, of course, several alternative  explanations;  e.g.,  the 
speaker  may  believe  that  the  description  is  more  likely  than  an 
accurate one to be interpreted correctly by the hearer.  Ferreting out 
exactly what the case is in a given situation requires  accounts of 
mutual belief  and the like.  A discussion  of these  issues  is beyond the 
scope of this  paper. 
h7 explain  certain  phenomena  in  discourse,  we  should  be 
somewhat  more  explicit about  the  notions  of center  and 
realization. 
We  have  said  that  each  utterance  S  in  a  discourse  has 
associated  with  it  a  backward-looking center,  Cb(S),  and 
a  set  of forward-looking centers,  Cf(S).  What manner  of 
objects  are  these  centers?  They  are  the  sort  of  objects 
that  can  serve  as  the semantic interpretations of singular 
noun  phrases.  7  That  is,  either  they  are  objects  in  the 
world  (e.g.,  planets,  people,  numbers}  or  they  are 
functions  from  possible worlds (situations, etc.}  to objects 
in  the  world  that  can  be  used  to  interpret  definite 
descriptions.  That  is,  whatever  serves  to  interpret  a 
definite noun  phrase can be a center. 
For the sake of concreteness in many of the examples in 
the  preceding  discussion, we  have  relied on  the situation 
semantics  of  Barwise  and  Perry.  The  theory  we  are 
developing does not  depend  on  this  particular semantical 
treatment  of  definite  noun  phrases,  but  it  does  require 
several  of  the  distinctions  that  treatment  provides.  In 
particular,  our  theory  requires  a  semantical  treatment 
that  accommodates  the  distinction  between 
interpretations  of  definite  noun  phrases  that  contribute 
their content to the propositions expressed by sentences in 
which  they occur  and  interpretations that contribute only 
their  denotation-in  other  words,  the  distinction  between 
value-free  and  value-loaded  interpretations.  As  noted,  a 
distinction  of  this  sort  can  be  effected  within  the 
framework  of  "possible-worlds"  approaches  to  the 
semantics  of  natural  language.  In  addition,  we  see  the 
need  for  interpretations  of  definite  noun  phrases  to  be 
dependent on their discourse context. Once again, this is a 
feature  of  interpretations  that  is  accommodated  in  the 
relational  approach  to  semantics  advocated  by  Barwise 
and  Perry,  but  it  might  be  accommodated  within  other 
approaches as well.  8 
Given  that  Cb(S),  the  center  of  sentence  S  in  a 
discourse,  is  the  interpretation of a  definite noun  phrase, 
how  does it  become related to S?  In  a  typical example, S 
will  contain  a  full  definite  noun  phrase  or  pronoun  that 
realizes  the  center.  The  realization  relation  is  neither 
semantic  nor  pragmatic.  For  example,  N  realizes  c  may 
hold  in  cages where  N  is a  definite description and  c is its 
denotation,  its  value-free  interpretation,  or  an  object 
related  to  it  by  a  "speaker's  reference."  More 
importantly,  when  N  is  a  pronoun,  the  principles  that 
govern  which  c  are  such  that  N  realizes  c  derive  from 
neither  semantics  nor  pragmatics  exclusively.  They  are 
principles  that  must  be  elicited  from  the  study  of 
discourse  itself.  A  tentative  formulation  of  some  such 
principles is given below. 
Though  it  is  typical  that,  when  c  is  a  center  of  S,  S 
contains  an  N  such  that  N  realizes  c,  it  is by  no  means 
necessary.  In  particular,  for  sentences  containing  noun 
7In a fuller treatment of our  theory  we will consider centers  that 
are realized by constituents  in other syntactic  categories. 
81srael [1983] discusses some of these issues and  compares  several 
properties  of  situation  semantics  with  Montague semantics. 
phrases that  express functional relations (e.g.,  "the door," 
• the  owner'}  whose  arguments  are  not  exhibited 
explicitly (e.g.,  a  house  is  the  current  center,  but  so  far 
neither  its door  nor  its owner  has  been  mentioned),  9  it  is 
sometimes  the  case  that  such  an  argument  can  be  the 
backward-looking  center  of  the  sentence.  We  are 
currently studying such  cases and  expect to integrate that 
study into our theory of discourse phenomena. 
The  basic  rule  that  constrains  the  realization  of  the 
backward-looking center of an utterance is a  constraint on 
the speaker, namely: 
[f the Cb of the current utterance is the same as the 
Cb of the previous utterance, a  pronoun should be used. 
There  are  two  things  to  note  about  this  rule.  First,  it 
does not preclude using pronouns for other entities as long 
as  one  is  used  for  the  center.  Second,  it  is  not  a  hard 
rule,  but  rather  a  principle,  like  a  Gricean  maxim,  that 
can  be  violated. However,  such  violations lead  at  best  to 
conditions  in  which  the  hearer  is  forced  to  draw 
additional inferences. 
As  a  simple  example,  consider  the  following  sequence, 
assuming  at  the  outset  that  John  is  the  center  of  the 
discourse: 
(Sa)  He  called  up  Mike  yesterday.  (he=John) 
(Sb)  He  ,as  annoyed  by  John's  call. 
(8b) is unacceptable, unless it is possible to consider the 
introduction of a second person named  "John."  However, 
intervening sentences  that  provide  for a  shift in center 
from John to Mike (e.g.,  "He was studying for his driver's 
test') suffice to make (8b) completely acceptable. 
Sidner's discourse focus corresponds roughly to Cb(S), 
while  her  potential foci correspond  approximately  to 
Cf(S).  However,  she  also introduces  an actor focus to 
handle multiple pronouns in a single utterance.  The basic 
centering  rule  not  only  aLlows  us  to  handle  the  same 
examples  more  simply,  but  also  appears  to  avoid  one  of 
the  complications  in  Sidner's  account.  Example  D4  from 
Sidner [1081} illustrates this problem: 
(9-1)I  haven't  seen  Jeff  for  several  days, 
(9-2)Carl thinks he's studying for his exams. 
(9-3)But  I think  he Tent  bo  the  Cape with  Llnda. 
On  Sidner's account, Carl is the actor focus after (0-2) 
and Jeff  is the discourse focus (Cb(9-2)). Because the actor 
focus  is  preferred  as  the  referrent  of  pronominal 
expressions, Carl  is the leading candidate  for the entity 
referred to by he in {9-3}.  It is difficult  to rule this case 
out without invoking fairly  special rules.  On our account, 
Jeff is Cb(0-2) and there is no problem.  The addition of 
actor  focus  was  made  to handle  multiple  pronouns--for 
example, if (9-3) were replaced by 
He thinks he studies too much. 
The  center rule allows such  uses, without  introducing a 
9Grosz [1977] refers to this  a~ "implicit focusing';  other examples 
are presented in Joshi and Weinstein [1981] 
~,8 second  kind of focus (or center), by permitting  entities 
other than Cb(S) to be pronominalized as long as Cb(S) 
is.l° 
Two aspects of centering  affect the kinds of inferences a 
hearer  must  draw  in  interpreting  a  definite  description. 
First,  the  shifting  of  center  from  one  entity  to  another 
requires  recognition  of  this  change.  Most  often  such 
changes  are  affected  by  the  use  of  full  definite  noun 
phrases,  but  in  some  instances  a  pronoun  may  be  used. 
For  example,  Grosz  [1977]  presents  several  examples  of 
pronouns  being  used  to  refer  to objects  mentioned  many 
utterances  back.  Second,  the  hearer  must  process 
(interpret)  the particular  linguistic  expression that realizes 
the center. 
Most previous attempts  to account for the interaction  of 
different kinds of referring expressions  with  centering and 
focusing  (or  "topic')  have  conflated  these  two.  For 
example, Joshi  and Weinstein [1981]  present a preliminary 
report on their  research regarding the connection between 
the computational complexity of the inferences required 
to process a discourse and the coherence of that discourse 
as  assessed  by  measures  that  invoke  the  centering 
phenomenon.  However, several  of the examples combine 
changes of expression and shifts  in centering. 
Violations of the basic  centering rule  require the hearer 
to  draw  two  different kinds  of  inferences. The  kind 
required depends on whether a full  definite  noun phrase is 
used to express the center or whether a pronoun is used 
for  a  noncentered  entity. We  will consider  each  case 
separately. 
Several different  functions  may be served by the use of 
a  full definite noun  phrase  to  realize the  currently 
centered entity. For instance, the full  noun phrase may 
include some  new  and  unshared  information  about  the 
entity. In such cases,  additional inferences  arise  from the 
need to determine that the center has not shifted  and that 
the properties expressed hold for the centered entity.  For 
example, in the following  sequences 
(I0)  I  toole  i 7  clog  to  the  vet  the  other  day. 
The mangy  old  beast... 
(11)  I'm  reading  The French Lieutenant's 
Woman.  The  book, which  In 
Fowles  best .... 
the full  definite  noun  phrases that are in boldface do 
more than merely refer. 
When  the  current  center  is  not  pronominalized  (it  may 
not  be  present  in  the  sentence),  the  use  of a  pronoun  to 
express  an  entity  other  than  the  current  center,  is 
strongly constrained.  The particular  cases  that  have  been 
identified  involve  instances  in  which  attention  is  being 
shifted  back  to  a  previously  centered  entity  (e.g.,  Grosz, 
1977;  Reichman,  1978)  or  to one element  of a  set  that  is 
currently  centered.  In  such  cases,  additional  inferences 
10Obviously, if Cb(S) is  not expressed'in  the  next sentence then 
this issue does not arise. 
are required  to determine  that  the pronoun does not refer 
to  the  current  center,  as  well  as  to  identify  the  context 
back  to  which  attention  is  shifting.  These  shifts,  though 
indicated  by  linguistic  expressions  typically  used  for 
centering (pronouns),  correspond to a shift in global focus. 
8.  Summary 
The  main  purpose of the  paper was  to sort out the 
confusion  about  the  roles of  syntactic, semantic,  and 
pragmatic factors in the interpretation and generation of 
definite noun phrases in discourse.  Specific  mechanisms 
that account for the interactions  among these  factors  were 
presented. Discourses were shown to be coherent at two 
different levels, i.e.,  with  referring expressions used  to 
identify entities that  are  centered  locally and  those 
focused  upon  more  globally.  The  differences between 
references at the global and local  levels  were discussed, 
and the interaction of the syntactic role  of a given noun 
phrase and its semantic interpretation with centering was 
described. 
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